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The Impacts of Free Trade Agreements on
                       Use of Antidumping 
   Abstract
This paper investigates the effects of  bilateral  trade agreements on  
the antidumping use. It points out the  antidumping investigations and 
measures imposed from the 16 major members of WTO, in the recent 
years. It also states the increasing number of use of antidumping and 
its policies in developing countries. From the available data it  
examines the alterations of antidumping investigations initated by a 
developed country (the USA) and a developing country (Brazil)  
against their major trading partners under bilateral trade agreements. 
It states  that if there is more or less antidumping use depending on  a 
country being developed or developing.
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1.Introduction
Many countries take action against dumping. The General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade lays down the principles to be followed by the member countries for 
imposition of anti-dumping duties. It has been argued that in the post-Uruguay-Round 
world, anti-dumping (AD) actions, as with other contingent protection measures, may 
become an 'instrument of choice' in place of tariffs to restrict international trade 
(Llyod and Morrissey, 1998). Pursuant to  GATT, 1994, detailed guidelines have  
been prescribed under the specific agreements which have also been incorporated into 
the national legislation of the member countries of the WTO. If investigations show 
that dumping is taking place and domestic industires are being hurt  or in other words 
if there is injury to imports-competing with domestic industry,  legislation pertmits 
countries to act against dumping. In order to do that the government has to be able to 
show that dumping is taking place, calculate the extent of dumping (how much lower 
the export price is compared to the exporter’s home market price), and show that the 
dumping is causing damage or threatening to do so. 
GATT (Article 6) allows countries to take action against dumping. The Anti-
Dumping Agreement clarifies and expands Article 6, and the two operate together. 
They allow countries to act in a way that would normally break the GATT principles 
of binding a tariff and not discriminating between trading partners — typically anti-
dumping action means charging extra import duty on the particular product from the 
particular exporting country in order to bring its price closer to  the “normal value” or 
to prevent the damage to domestic industry in the importing country. WTO 
agreement allows goverments to act against dumping when real damage occurs to the 
domesic industry.
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According to the WTO antidumping action can be defined as, charging 
additional import duty on the particular product from a foreign country in order to 
bring its price closer  to home country`s.  The exporting country can undertake to 
raise its price to an agreed level in order to avoid antidumping import duty. The  
GATT/WTO statues over the past 25 years, the legal definition of ‘dumping’ is 
almost completely divorced from any economic notion of antidumping (Blonigen-
Prusa, 2001).  There are many different ways of calculating whether a particular 
product is being dumped heavily or only lightly. The agreement follows a range of 
possible options.1  Before 1980 almost all AD activity was restricted to six major 
countries: The USA, the EU, Australia, Canada, South Africa and New Zealand with 
a total number of cases of  two or three-dozen per year at the most. After 1980, not 
only the EU and the USA still  had the most AD cases but also developing countries 
such as Brazil, India and Turkey have become intense users of AD. The trend has 
been altered recently where the developing countries have started using antidumping 
to limit their imports, many of them have also given up most other forms of flexibility 
in trade policy adopting WTO diciplines and agreeing to bind their tariffs ( Bown, 
2007).
In this paper, first of all  we want to demonstrate the alterations in  the new 
antidumping  initiations and the antidumping measures that are imposed   by the 
WTO members and we will compare the adjustments that took place during the 2007-
2008 time period.  By doing so we will be proving   how the trend changes in terms
     1Persuant to the WTO, antidumping measures are also classified into three, such as, the main one is based on the price 
in the exporter´s domestic market, another one is the price charged by the exporter in another county, finally the last one 
is a calculation based on the combination of the exporter´s production cost, other expenses and normal profit margins. 
AD measures must expire five years after the date of imposition.In some cases AD investigations end immediately in 
cases where the authorities determine that the margin of dumping is insignificantly.
5
of AD initiations from developed to developing countries.
Secondly we will show how the Free Trade Agreements affect the use of 
antidumping on goverments. Depending on the size of the economy( developed or 
developing countries) we want to figure out what  the impact is of FTAs on 
antidumping use . In our examples we will use the AD initiations of the USA and
Brazil, depending on whether it is a developed  or developing country, respectively. 
Latterly, we will show the case of AD initiations without any FTAs.
Then, we will estimate some econometric models, explaining the number of 
AD initiations by using the macroeconomic determinants, to see  what  the 
significance of FTAs is on the use of antidumping. We will  estimate the USA-
Canada, under a FTA  (CUSTA) , the USA-Mexico under NAFTA, as the USA is 
reporter country whereas Canada and Mexico are its trading partners. Also we will 
review of developing countrys’ use of antidumping investigations and measures 
imposed after the 1980s.  Finally, we will estimate the model for Brazil and its 
trading partner Argentina under MERCOSUR. 
2.The  new AD investigations and measures imposed during 2007-
2008 
According to recent data from WTO , comparing 2008 to 2007, the number of 
new antidumping investigations  increased by 31%, whereas  the number of  
antidumping measures applied increased by only 19%. During the same  period 
developing countries dominated this trend in terms of AD investigations and AD 
2 These 16 Members are: developing countries such as; Argentina, Brazil, China, Colombia, Egypt,  India, Pakistan, 
South Africa, Taiwan, Turkey, and developed countries such as; Australia , Canada, European Union, New Zealand,
South Korea  and the United States.
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measures. They initiated 73% of all new investigations but on the other hand they 
were the target of 78% of all new initiations (Bown, 2007).
Pursuent to data from WTO,  16 Members2 initiated 85% of all antidumping 
investigations by the WTO membership during 1995-2006. In 2007 those sixteen
WTO members initiated a total number of 143 new antidumping investigations while
in 2008 the total number of initations was  188. They applied 100 AD measures in 
2007 and 120 AD measures in 2008 with an increase of 20%  in one year.     
Developed countries, in 2007, initated 58 (41%)  new investigations and applied 23 
(23%) new AD measures, comparing to 2008. In 2008 they initiated 50 (27%) of the 
total 188 new investigations and imposed 54 (45%) of the 120 new AD measures. On 
the other hand, in 2008, developing countries initiated 138 (73%) of the 188 new 
investigations and imposed 66 (55%) of the 120 new final measures for 2008. This 
compares with 85 (59%) new investigations and 77 (77%) new measures that 
developing countries applied in 2007.
In 2008 The most antidumping investigations in developed countries were from 
the United States and the European Union  (18 each), followed by Australia (6), 
South Korea (5), Canada (3). From the developing countries India initiated the most 
antidumping investigations in 2008, with 54 new initiations. It was followed by
Turkey and Brazil (23 each), Argentina (19), China (7), Colombia (6), Pakistan, and 
South Africa (3 each). Egypt and New Zealand had initiated new investigations in 
2007, but they did not initiate any new investigations in 2008. 
Comparing 2007 to 2008, there is a  declining number of    AD initations  for 
the United States, South Africa, and South Korea, but there is an increasing number 
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of  AD initiations  for Canada, the European Union, India, Pakistan, Turkey, China, 
Colombia, Australia, Brazil, and Argentina. The most commonly investigated 
products in 2008 were  raw materials such as; the steel and iron sector with a number 
of 48 initiations, followed by the chemical sector and the textile/apperal sectors (35 
initiations each). In the iron and steel sector, India initiated one half of them, while 
the EU initated only 11. 
In 2008 China’s products were  most fequently subjected to new antidumping 
measures, comprising of 41% (49 new measures) of the 120 new measures imposed 
during that period. These 49 measures were imposed on Chinese exports, followed by 
the EU (9), Taiwan (8), South Korea (7), the US (6), India and Indonesia (4 each). 
3. Developing countries and  AD Policy
Implementation of antidumping  in developing countries has become frequent 
in recent years. Before a government can enforce an antidumping import restriction,  
WTO Agreement requires sufficient economic corroboration to confirm that 
behaviour of  foreign exporters and the market conditions convince the legal criteria 
and procedures. Within antidumping laws and the economic incentives , domestic 
industries diverge in their need and skill to attain import protection.                                            
Table 3.1. Presents the antidumping investigations and imposed measures among the 
developing countries which have been WTO member since 1995. The same table 
highlights the steady increase in developing countries’ initiations and their position 
with respect to the number of measures actually taken. Table 3.1.2 demonstrates the 
four developed economies that are active users of AD during the WTO period. The  
period is intercepted in 1995, to compare the total amount of AD investigations under 
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GATT (before 1995) and under WTO (after 1995). A substantial amount of 
antidumping investigation and imposed measures have been utilized by developing 
countries such as: Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, 
Turkey and Venezuela. Between 1995-2005 these nine developing countries utilized 
39.5% of all the new investigations and 44.8% of all the new measures imposed. 
Table 3.1. - Nine Developing countries Use of AD under GATT and WTO Periods
Country GATT period, 1985-1994 WTO Period, 1995-2004
9 Developing Countries                  Number of AD Number of AD Number of AD
                 Investigations Investigations Measures Imposed
Argentina 44 192 139
Brazil 58 116 62
Colombia 11 23 11
India 9 400 302
Indonesia 0 60 23
Mexico 123 79 69
Peru 11 55 34
Turkey 74 89 77
Venezuela 6 31 25
Total 336 1045 742
Share of total 16.2% 39.5% 44.8%
Source: Chad P.Bown, 2007, table 1, page 27.
During the same period four developed countries initiated 36.4% of all cases and they 
used 33% of all new measures imposed. Under GATT, developing countries initiated 
only a total of 16.2% of  the  cases whereas  four developed countries initiated a total 
73.1% of the cases.
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Table 3.2.-Four Developed Country Use of AD under GATT and WTO  Periods
Country   GATT period, 1985-1994 WTO Period, 1995-2004
4 Developed Countries                  Number of AD Number of AD Number of AD
                 Investigations Investigations Measures Imposed
Australia 447 172 54
Canada 223 133 80
European Union 364 303 193
United States 475 354 219
Total 1509 962 546
Share of total 73.1% 36.4% 33.0%
Source: Chad P.Bown, 2007, table 1, page 27.
Table 3.3 presents some of the products which industries use more number of 
antidumping  protection from imports. Each developing country initiated at least one 
antidumping investigation and received import protection under at least one imposed 
measure.
Table 3.3.- Antidumping Use by Industry Across Nine Developing Countries, 1995-2002 
COUNTRY Iron and
Steel
Chemicals Fabricated 
Metal
Glass  
products
Food 
products
Textiles TOTAL
ARGENTINA 5 5 6 5 3 2 26
BRAZIL 6 6 4 3 3 2 24
COLOMBIA 3 3 0 0 0 1 7
INDIA 6 7 1 0 0 2 16
INDONOSIA 5 2 0 0 1 0 8
MEXICO 5 5 2 0 3 1 16
PERU 2 3 1 0 3 1 10
TURKEY 1 3 1 0 0 3 8
VENEZULA 4 2 1 0 0 0 7
Source: Global Antidumping Database
Between 1995-2002  the iron - steel and chemical sectors received the highest 
number of antidumping  protection across nine developing countries with a total 
number of 37 and 35 , respectively.  Raw material products constitute the main AD 
investigations in these 9 developing countries. Argentina has the highest number of 
AD investigations (26), from the 6 industries mentioned in table 3.6.3. , followed by 
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Brazil (24) , India and Mexico (16 each). Peru (10), Turkey (8), Colombia and 
Venezuela (7 each). Antidumping investigations tend to be disproportinately 
concentrated in a few industries. Within active user industries, there are large and 
powerful firms that dominate the use of antidumping (Aggarwal,2007).
According to data from the WTO, more than 2500 antidumping investigations were 
initiated globally between January 1995 and June 2004. However not all of these 
investigations yielded definitive measures. The number of measures actually in force 
as of the 30 June 2004 was just under 1350.
4. FTAs and the impacts on use of AD
In this part we will demonstrate the chrolonological  evolution of AD 
initiations of the USA against Canada and Mexico, and also intiations of Brazil 
against Uruguay and Argentina under the bilateral  agreements. Later on we will 
compare Brazil as a reporter country against  its trading partners the USA and the EU 
without any bilaterel agreement and also with the rest of the world. ( major trading 
partners)
4.1. CUSFTA: the USA and Canada Case (the USA-AD user)
CUSFTA (Canada-United States free trade agreement) was a bileteral trade 
agreement signed by Canada and the United States on October 4, 1988. The 
agreement, finalized by October 1987, changed several trade restrictions in stages
over a ten year period, and resulted in a great increase in cross-border trade.  In the 
following section we have two tables that shows AD initiations during the time 
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period between 1980 and 2006. Table 4.1.A shows us the evaluation of AD 
investigations of the USA against Canada from 1980 to 1988 when is the negatiation 
date of bileteral agreement. 
Table4.1A. - Periods before CUSFTA (1980-1988)
Years 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Investigations 
per year 2 1 2 3 3 4 3 2 4
Periods 1980-1988
Average investigation per year 2.66
From the table, the total  number of AD investigations is 24. In 1981 there is only one 
investigation while in 1985 and 1988 have the highest number of investigations (4 for 
each year). Before the CUSFTA during 1980-1988 the average AD investigation 
initiated per year is 2.66. Similarly table 4.1.B. demonstrates us the number of AD 
investigations after the biletarel agreement, the period of 1989-2006.
Table4.1B. Periods after CUSFTA (1989-2006)
Years 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Investigations 
per year 1 - 4 4 1 - - - 2
Years 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Investigations 
per year 3 - 1 4 1 1 3 4 3
Periods 1989-2006
Average investigations per year 1.77
The time periods after CUSFTA , the total  number of investigations is 32  . In 1990, 
1994, 1995 and 1999 there are no AD investigations that are initiated. During 1989-
2006 the average AD investigations initiated per year is 1.77. We can clearly see that 
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after the negotiation, the average antidumping investigations per year  against  
Canada diminished from 2.66 to 1.77.
4.2. NAFTA: the USA and Mexico Case
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is a trilateral trade bloc in North 
America shaped by the governments of the United States, Canada, and Mexico. The 
agreement came into force on January 1, 1994. It superseded the Canada-United 
States Free Trade Agreement in 1988.
Table 4.2A. points out the AD investigations  since 1980 untill the negotiation date 
1994. the total number of AD investigations initiated against Mexico is 19. During 
1980-1983 and 1987-1989 there are no reported AD investigations by the USA. In 
1992  the highest number of initiations occur (5). 
Table.4.2A - Periods before NAFTA (1980-1994)
Year 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Inv. - - - 1 1 2 2 - - 2 1 1 5 2 2
Periods 1980-1994
Average investigation per year 1.26
To see the path of number of AD investigations after the FTA, table 4.2.B. presents 
summary data of the cases in each year from 1995 to 2006. 
Table 4.2B-Periods after NAFTA (1995-2006)
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Inv. 1 1 - 4 2 - 3 1 1 2 5 6
Periods 1995-2006
Average investigation per year 2.16
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The total amount  of AD investigations initiated against Mexico after 1994 is 26. In 
1997 and 2000 there are not any investigations whereas in 2006 there are 6 
investigations. These results present  the total number of  AD investigations initiated 
against Mexico increases after the negotiation of  free trade agreement. The total 
antidumping cases that are initiated against Mexico has increased from 19 to 26  
between the time period  stated  above. The average investigation per year increases 
from 1.26 to 2.16 after bilateral agreement. On the other hand, the cases in each year 
grow significantly  and almost every year at least   exists 1 investigation-except in 
1997 and 2000 after the negotiation date. 
4.3.The U.S. and the Rest of the World                                                             
What about the rest of the world that is trading with the USA? Do biletarel 
agreements effect the rest of the world? Using the required database  for the USA we 
can state that  starting from 1980 untill 1988 -  the negotiation date for the CUSFTA  
( Canada-USA FTA)- the total amount of AD investigations in the USA is 445. after 
the negotiation date to the year 2000 the total amount of AD investigations is 505. 
Similarly, with  NAFTA from 1980 to the negotiation date the total amount of  AD 
investigations is 761. Later, the  total number of investigations is 395. However, in 
contrast there is a diminishing number of investigations initiated from the rest of the 
world, whereas there is an increasing number of  investigations  after the trading 
agreements were in enforced.
4.4. MERCOSUR: Brazil-Argentina and Uruguay Case 
Mercosurs is  a Regional Trade Agreement (RTA) among Argentina, Brazil, 
Paraguay and Uruguay established in 1991 by the Treaty of Asunción, which was 
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later modified and updated by the 1994 Treaty of Ouro Preto. From the available 
data,  from 1988 to the negoatiation date 1994 there are only 2    AD investigations 
initated against both Argentina and Uruguay (1 initiation from each country). Later 
on 1995 to 2003 there are 3 initiations, 2 against Argentina and 1 against Uruguay by 
Brazil. However, comparing this situation with  the rest of the world, there is a high 
increasing number of total antidumping investigations. For the period from  1988 to 
1994 the total cases initiated are 64, but also the period of  from 1995 to 2003 the 
total number of cases initiated are 137. 
Table 4.4. AD investigations by Brazil after and before MERCOSUR
Investigations 
between
Investigations 
Between
Country 1988-1994 1995-2003
Argentina 1 2
Uruguay 1 1
Rest of the world 64 137
Average investigations per year 9.47 17.5
  
The average number of investigations initited by Brazil against the all trading 
partners has been increased from 9.5 to 17.5 after the MERCOSUR.
4.5 Brazil- the EU and Brazil-the USA and the Rest of the world 
We will consider the use of AD investigations under biletarel trade 
agreements between Brazil-the EU and Brazil-the USA. However this time there are 
no FTAs between those countries. We shall compare the impact of the use of AD 
with and without a bilateral agreement. 
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Referring to data between 1988-2003 the  total number of AD investigations 
initiated from the EU is 25 and from the USA is 32. The most protected goods were 
industrial chemicals from both countries.  From the necessary data in GATT for the 
period (1985-1994) Brazil reported 58 AD investigations on the other hand , in WTO 
period (1995-2004), it reported 166 AD investigations from all over the world. 
During the same period the total number of antidumping measures imposed was 62. 
Brazil is one of the most frequent AD users in the developing countries. But which 
industries use antidumping to pursue protection? The following table identifies the 
sectors targeted in the majority of Brazilian trade  cases. 
Table 4.5A- Brazil- the AD investigations and measures imposed from the imported goods
INDUSTRY Investigations Shares in 
Investigations
Measures 
Imposed
Shares in 
Measures 
Imposed
Agricultural Products 25 11.8% 6 11.3%
Chemicals                 81 38.2% 23 43.4%
Steel and Steel Related 54 25.5% 8 15.0%
Textile 11 5.2% 3 5.7%
Other non-metal industries 17 8.0% 3 5.7%
Manufactures 24 11.3% 10 18.9%
Total 212 100% 53 100%
Source: 2003 DECOM Annual Report 
Chemicals are by far the most affected product category, followed by steel and steel 
related products, agricultural and manufactured products. The following table 
demonstrates a remarkable concentration of AD measures against exports from 
China. Russian and Indian exports have also been targeted by Brazilian authorities.
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Table 4.5B- Brazil- the AD investigations and measures imposed in major trading partners
Initiations Reviews
China 21 9
India 6 5
Russia 7 3
South Africa 5 2
Mexico 4 2
Germany 4 1
Kazakhstan 3 2
Total 164 35
Source: Global Antidumping Database
Brazil’s use of antidumping investigations increased as the country became more 
integrated to its trade liberalization program in the 1990s. However, compared to the 
United States, where almost the entirety of antidumping investigations involve the 
application of provisional duties, in Brazil only 46% of the cases resulting in the 
application of antidumping duties involved provisional measures. In sum, Brazil’s 
antidumping legislation and procedures are similar to that of other WTO Members 
(Barral- Brogini, 2005).
5. Methodology and Data
In the following section  we define the economic model that would allow to make the 
estimation. Available data sources are used to construct the econometric model. The 
antidumping data used in the empirical analysis is  product-level information on 
antidumping investigations, outcomes and affected products are constructed from
original source national government publications and accumulated in the Global 
Antidumping Database (Bown, 2007). The creation of many of the explanatory 
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variables needed for the econometric estimation is obtained from United Nations
Statistic Division- Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE).
5.1. Econometric Model
The econometric model is constructed as follows: The dependent variable is 
antidumping investigations while the explanatory variables are macroeconomic trends 
and a dummy variable. We want to explain the initiations  in a given year by   the 
imports of  a reporter country   and  the exports of its  partner country in a given year. 
And also  the damage to the domestic importing country and  the threat of retaliation  
maybe important answers to this research question (Jallab, 2005). We also add a 
dummy variable which considers the bilateral agreements between reporter and its 
trading partner country.  The econometric model approach uses maximum likelihood  
estimation.
One can demonstrate this relationship as ;
yit  0  1t Mit  2t X jt  3tmit  4 t x jt  5t  it
Where;  ity is the number of AD investigations initiated by country i
itM is the imports from country j to country i
jtX is the exports of country i to country j
itm is damage to domestic importing country and can be defined as;
1
1


it
itit
it M
MM
m
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jtx is potential threat to domestic exporting industry because of possible retaliation 
       and can be defined as;
1
1


jt
jtjt
jt X
XX
x
 is the dummy variable (FTA),
it is the standard error term.
Also; i      is the reporting country  and  j is its trading partner.
o is  the constant term and 1,2,3,4,5 are the coefficients of  the explanatory 
variables. It is important to mention that yit =0,1,2,3… is a count variable, ranging 
from zero to many. 
Hence ,count data models are commonly applied to this problem. Choice of model 
depends on the Poisson regression model, which assumes that yit is conditional 
upon the imports and exports, follows a Poisson distribution. 
In this paper; the estimations of  the use of antidumping cases based on  two reporting 
countries ,USA and Brazil respectively ,with their trading partners. First of all we 
estimated the case of USA-Canada and USA-Mexico under bilateral agreements, then 
we  continued with the case of Brazil-Argentina under a bilateral agreement. In some 
of the estimations we add  lags for both imports  exports of trading countries, because 
the antidumping authorities frequently rely on data from the most recently completed 
one or two or sometimes three year period in their consideration of injury trends.
5.2. The case of USA-Canada under CUSFTA in 1988
Using the necessary data mentioned above, we estimated the econometric model. The 
RTA dummy refers to CUSTA that signed in 1988. 
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The table A in the appendix, reports  the basic estimation equation of  Poisson 
regression model by maximum likelihood estimation. The times series show yearly 
antidumping investigations between 1980 to 2006. The signs of the coefficients are 
positive   for the first lag of imports and exports and also consistent for the potential 
threat to the domestic exporting country whereas the signs of coefficients are negative 
for the constant term, the damage for the domestic importing country and the dummy 
variable. The predicted probability of the dummy variable is 0.018 and it is  
significant at 5% significance level. The coefficient of imports  in the first lag is 
negative, which means, the injury in the industry level is caused by the imports from 
its trading partner. The result for the dummy variable is consistent with the theory 
that it is mentioned previously. After the negotiation date it is expected to have less 
antidumping investigations initiated from Canada. This situation can be seen from the 
table A in the appendix with a negative  coefficient and with a  significant p-value for 
the dummy variable, CUSFTA bilateral trade agreement.
5.3. The case of  USA-Mexico  under NAFTA in 1994
Table B from the appendix, it reports the estimation using the same 
explanatory variables for Mexico as a result of trade with the  USA. The  dummy 
variable is the NAFTA regional trade agreement.
From the estimation outcomes, the signs of coefficients for explanatory 
variables are positive for  the imports, the exports and   the dummy variable. On the 
other hand, the signs of coefficients are negative for the constant term, the first lag of 
the imports and exports. The p-value for  first lag of dummy variable is 0.045 and it is 
significant at 5% significance level. Since the dummy variable is positive and 
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significant, the estimation result is consistent with the theory. After the NAFTA, 
there are more AD investigations initiated against Mexico by the USA.
5.4.The case of Brazil-Argentina under MERCOSUR in 1994
Appendix C presents the outcomes from the regression. The FTA agreement 
MERCOSUR is the dummy variable of the regression. Estimation results show the 
only the coefficient of  exports and dummy are positive. The dummy variable is not 
significant at any significance level. Because the number of AD investigations is only 
3, hence it is not the model. The econometric estimation of the AD investigations 
from Argentina does not justify the empirical results demonstrated in 4.4.
6. Conclusions
Since the middle of the 1990s, there is a general upward trend in both antidumping 
investigations and measures imposed by developing countries. Brazil, Argentina, 
China, India and South Africa are the major users of antidumping in recent years. 
Within user countries, AD investigations concentrated in a few industries. These 
industries were mainly steel, chemicals and raw materials. More than 2500 
antidumping investigations were initiated globally between 1995 -2004. The reason 
of increasing number of antidumping use by developing countries is discussed by 
some authors.  Bown (2007) argues that the increase in antidumping use by 
developing countries raises the concern that much of the trade liberalization 
commitments they undertook as part of the Uruguay Round negotiations may be 
offset de facto by new protection (Bown,2007)
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The USA is still the one of the major users of antidumping between developed 
countries. After the negotiation date of CUSTA in 1988 with Canada and under 
NAFTA in 1994 with Canada and Mexico, the USA initiated more antidumping 
investigations against Mexico but  less  AD investigations against Canada. After 
NAFTA the USA has initiated less antidumping investigation against the rest of the 
world.
Brazil is the one of the major users of antidumping in recent years. Brazil´s use of 
antidumping measures increased as the country integrated to its trade liberalization 
programme in the 1990s. After MERCOSUR in 1994 between Argentina and 
Uruguay,  Brazil initiated slightly more antidumping investigations. In recent years , 
most of the AD investigations were against China and Russia In Brazil the AD 
investigations concentrated into  industries such as; chemicals, steel, agricultural 
products and manufactures. In Brazil only 46% of the cases resulting in the 
application of antidumping duties involved provisional measures.
The econometric model is constructed by using Poisson regression model because of 
the dependent variable initiations are ranging from zero to a count variable. FTA 
agreements are used as dummy variable to see the significance on the use of AD 
investigations against the trading partners. From the estimation outcomes, dummy 
variables for the USA-Canada is significant with a negative coefficient sign whereas 
dummy variable for the USA-Mexico is also significant with a positive coefficient 
sign. In this case the both estimations are statistically and economically are 
significant Both cases are consistent with the theory: We expect less antidumping 
investigations initiated against Canada, but more initiations against Mexico by the 
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USA. On the other hand dummy variable for Brazil and Argentina is not significant 
but with a positive coefficient because  the number of initiations is very small.
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APPENDIX- Estimation Outcomes
TABLE A
          
  Explanatory Variables
Dependent Variable : Number of Antidumping     Investigations 
Initiated by the USA against Canada 1980-2006 
Number of Observation 16 after adjustments
R –square                                                     57%
                      
Explanatory           Variables Coefficient z-statistic p-value
     
                     
Constant -6.592 -1.558 0.119
Imports in t-1 0.463 1.357 0.174
Damage to the  domestic      
importing industry
-0.217 -0.069 0.658
Exports in t-1 0.514 1.277 0.201
Potential threat to the  
domestic exporting industry
0.615 0.864 0.387
Dummy -1.385 -2.357 0.0184**
LR-Statistic 6.6700
Loglikelihood -43.095
* *significant at 5% significance level
24
TABLE B
          
  Explanatory Variables
Dependent Variable : Number of 
Antidumping     Investigations Initiated by 
the USA against  Mexico 1980-2006 
Number of Observation 14 after adjustments
R –square                                                    57%
                      
Explanatory Variables Coefficient z-statistic p-value
     
                     
Constant -1.387* -2.947                      0.0032
Imports in t 0.494 0.419                      0.6747
Damage to the
Domestic importing industry
-0.469 -0.415                      0.6776
Exports in t 0.832 0.638                      0.5235
Potential threat to the
Domestic exporting industry
-1.478 -1.244                      0.2133
Dummy 3.330** -1.405                      0.0451
LR-Statistic
                                                                                        
                                                                                                     
11.382
Loglikelihood                                                                                         
-22.6531
*significant at 1% significance level
**significant at 5% significance level
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TABLE C
          
  Explanatory Variables
Dependent Variable : Number of Antidumping     Investigations 
Initiated by the Brazil against  Argentina 1988-2006 
Number of Observation                                                    19 
R –square                                                    23%
                      
Explanatory Variables Coefficient z-statistic p-value
     
                     
Constant -4.835 -0.177 0.8592
Imports -2.567 3.819 0.5016
Damage to the domestic
importing industry in t
-2.500 -1.182 0.2369
Exports in t 2.858 0.936 0.3492
Potential threat to the
domestic exporting country in t
0.735 1.865         0.0621***
Dummy 1.282 -0.481 0.6303
LR-Statistic
                                                                                        
                                                                                               2.6532
Loglikelihood                                                                                         -7.2108
